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TIM WU
THE COPYRIGHT PARADOX
Copyright law has become an important part of American industrial
policy. Its rules are felt by every industry that touches information,
and today that means quite a bit.' Like other types of industrial
policy, copyright in operation purposely advantages some sectors
and disadvantages others. Consequently, today's copyright courts
face hard problems of competition management, akin to those faced
by the antitrust courts and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion.'
How should courts manage competition using copyright? Over
the last decade, writers have begun to try to understand the "other
side" of copyright, variously called its innovation policy, commu-
nications policy, or regulatory side.3 Here I want to focus attention
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on a crucial problem of decisional method that is becoming more
clearly important to copyright decisions. Courts in both copyright
and antitrust face a choice between what we can characterize as
"bad actor" and "welfarist" models of deciding cases. The "bad
actor" approach punishes alleged wrongdoers based on malicious
behavior of the suspect and the prospect of harm to favored sectors
of the economy, like small businesses (in antitrust) or the enter-
tainment industries (in copyright). The "welfarist" approach, by
contrast, calls for judges generally to ignore intent or "bad behavior"
in exchange for a disciplined focus on questions of industry eco-
nomics and consumer, or user, welfare. The welfarist approach ac-
cepts Adam Smith's premise that certain forms of malicious be-
havior may promote overall social well-being, on balance, though
some may not.
The tension between these approaches became clear in the Su-
preme Court's 2005 decision in Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc.
v Grokster, Ltd.4 In Grokster the Court side-stepped a welfarist cal-
culation called for by existing law, and turned instead to a "bad
actor" approach. Faced with a vicious fight between disreputable
firms and the incumbent industry, the Court chose to punish the
bad guys. To the Court, and to many observers, the Grokster decision
was a good political way out of a very difficult problem. As a one-
shot political compromise, the decision managed to avoid outraging
either the electronics or incumbent distribution industries, and was
successful in that regard. However, if Grokster is also meant to serve
as a model of how copyright should manage competition, the draw-
backs of the Grokster model are manifest.
First, if we accept that courts should be actively choosing winners
and losers among various types of market entrants, we need to ask
whether Grokster's focus on intentionally bad behavior is a good
way to create market-entry rules. As discussed below, the approach
can be defended, particularly under the facts of Grokster itself. But
at its worst, the Court's approach in Grokster risks putting copyright
where antitrust was in the 1960s, punishing businesses without ask-
Colum L Rev 1618 (2001); Kathryn Judge, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 Stan L Rev
901 (2004); Joseph Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 NC L Rev 87 (2004); Randal C. Picker,
Fron Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization
of Copyright, 70 U Chi L Rev 281 (2003); Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy,
103 Mich L Rev 278 (2004); see also Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Orga-
nization of Information Production, 22 Intl Rev L & Econ 81 (2002).
4 125 S Ct 2764 (2005).
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ing whether consumer welfare is served or harmed by the business
model in question. That is not to say Grokster is an easy case either
way. But it can be a dangerous business to create industrial policy
focused on the perceived malice of the defendant as opposed to
measures of economic consequence. That, at least, is what antitrust
writers long ago concluded. As the late Phillip Areeda put it, "'pur-
pose' or 'intent' have been particularly slippery, ambiguous, and
unsatisfactory in the antitrust world."' The problem that antitrust
scholars point out is that "bad behavior" is sometimes just another
name for competitive behavior, of the kind the legal system might
want to encourage.
Second, even within the welfarist approach to copyright, an old
but still uncomfortable question remains. How comfortable are we
with the federal courts, as in Grokster or Sony, using the copyright
code to set market-entry policy for new technologies at all? The
answer is not entirely obvious. Some might argue that since copy-
right infringement is a tort, the Court has the duty to work out a
full theory of secondary liability. Others might prefer the federal
courts' relative insulation from interest-group politics. But arguably
what the Court is doing with copyright's competition policy is as
technical and economic as the problems the Supreme Court rou-
tinely defers to the Federal Communications Commission. The case
National Cable & Telecommunications Assn v Brand XInternet Services,6
released the same day as Grokster, makes this institutional contrast
clear. In both cases the Court faced hard problems of technology
and economics. In Grokster, the Court has little hesitation in making
policy for an extremely complex and evolving technological prob-
lem, but in Brand X the Court bent over backward to defer to an
expert agency.
What the courts in cases like Grokster are doing is akin to trying
to decide on the right level of an industrial subsidy in the face of
technological change. That is a hard challenge for any branch of
government, including Congress, and indeed Congress's interest-
group-dominated method has a mixed record.7 But as the federal
s Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, 3 Antitrust Law 601 (2d ed 2002).
6 125 S Ct 2688 (2005).
'Perhaps the best-known failure is the Audio-Digital Home Recording Act of 1992,
which was an effort to handle the invention of digital recording technology. The Act
focused on the digital audio tape, which it simply managed to render uncompetitive, and
as a whole the Act was almost irrelevant to the struggle over digital copyright discussed
in this article.
232 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
courts continue to encounter the question of just how much pro-
tection is warranted in the face of disruptive technologies, the ques-
tions of institutional competence may become even more intense.
Stated otherwise, beyond the question of decisional method lie un-
answered questions of legal process.8 Where does the courts' relative
institutional competence to handle adjustments to copyright in the
face of technological change begin and end? That is not an easy
question to answer. Yet it is beyond question that at some point the
Court may need to releam how to hand problems over to a con-
gressional process.
I. How COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST MANAGE COMPETITION
While traditionally associated with the promotion of indi-
vidual authorship, copyright in operation also creates industrial pol-
icy. It provides some level of support and protection to a group of
favored industries-the film industry, recording industry, software,
and publishing-at some expense to other industries and consumers.
The theory is that, absent such protection, the favored industries
would not be viable, hence the need for government protection.9
For various reasons, expressive works are unusual and less likely to
be produced at optimal levels absent government intervention. Yet
this leaves open a very hard question: What is the right degree to
which other industries should sustain such costs to support the
creation of expressive works that is necessary to copyright-depen-
dent industries?
These problems are faced in their most difficult form when copy-
right considers the market entry of new technologies of copying
and distribution, like the electronics and telecommunications in-
dustries." New communications industries, like radio, cable, or in-
ternet distribution, inevitably threaten existing companies. And
copyright, for better or worse, has emerged as a central tool for
managing the market entry of certain types of disruptive technology.
The challenge is, in some rough way, to allow new technologies to
' Cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 158 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey, eds,
1994) ("What is each of these institutions good for? How can it be made to do its job
best? How does, and how should, its working dovetail with the working of the others?").
'There are some analogues in copyright policy to strategic trade policy. Cf. Elhanan
Helpman and Paul Krugman, Trade Policy and Market Structure (1989).
" See generally Picker, 70 U Chi L Rev (cited in note 3).
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emerge while still fairly protecting the incentives to create expres-
sive works. Those are not goals easily reconciled, and the result has
always been some kind of messy trade-off.
The copyright system in the twentieth century often dealt with
these problems through a mixed congressional and court-driven
process that led to legally managed settlements called compulsory
licensing schemes." Stated briefly, the new industry and the in-
cumbent distributors, sometimes over a period of decades, would
fight both in the courts and in Congress until finally arriving at a
settlement. These deals, placed directly in the copyright statute as
compulsory licensing schemes, typically struck a balance. The new
industry got a right to access copyright works crucial to its com-
mercial success. In exchange, the new industry would make some
kind of ongoing transfer payment, set by statute, to the incumbent
copyright owners and incumbent distributors. 2
Since the 1980s, copyright has mainly taken a different approach
and used a different policy tool for managing market-entry prob-
lems. Perhaps in reaction to the decades-long battles that led to
compulsory licenses, the new system is more clearly court managed.
It is usually called the Sony system, after the decision on the legality
of the Sony Betamax VCR in Sony Corp. of America v Universal City
Studios, Inc. 3 As the Court said at the time, it was "strik[ing] a
balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effec-
tive [protection] . . . and the rights of others freely to engage in
substantially unrelated areas of commerce."' 4
What is the Sony rule, and how does it manage competition? The
Sony Court ruled the VCR a legal technology, despite the fact that
it could be and was used for infringing purposes. Interestingly, the
Sony Court claimed to be deferring to a congressional resolution
of the battle between Hollywood and Sony-yet it still went ahead
and created a judge-centric rule meant to distinguish desirable from
undesirable market entrants. The Court said (using language that
most copyright lawyers know by heart) that a manufacturer of copy-
ing technology is not liable for the infringements of its users "if
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable pur-
" See Wu, 103 Mich L Rev at 288-97, 309-25 (cited in note 3).
12 Id.
13464 US 417 (1984).
14 Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 US 417, 442 (1984).
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poses." "Indeed," said the Court, "it need merely be capable of
substantial non-infringing uses.""i
While there is great disagreement over the meaning of the Sony
rule, its method is fairly clear. At bottom, the Sony test asks courts
to conduct some weighing of the social costs and benefits of any
new technology. The disagreement over meaning arises over what
can legitimately constitute a cost or benefit of a new technology,
and in which direction the presumptions should run.
There are obvious ambiguities on both sides of the Sony ledger.
The benefits are a technology's "legitimate purposes"-the benefit
to consumers of a new technology (in Sony itself, the luxury of taping
TV programs and watching them later). Later courts, including the
Grokster Court, describe this as the interest in "innovation," and it
can also be described as the consumer surplus generated by a right-
ward shift in the supply curve. 6 But here is the problem: should
the Court focus on consumer uses clearly manifest at the time of
decision, or try to take into account future uses of the technology?
In other words, if a new technology has a social value of 10 today,
but a future value of 1,000, is it worth a present harm of 100?17
The Court, in Sony, unsurprisingly, did not answer that question.
One reading of Sony takes the language "merely capable" to create
a presumption-that judges should not block any technology unless
it is absolutely clear that the product is not even theoretically ca-
pable of uses that are not illegal. While not quite so saying, the
Ninth Circuit came close to endorsing this position in the Grokster
litigation. 8 But others firmly reject the idea that Sony has any such
presumption. Judge Posner has interpreted Sony as limited to extant
uses on the record. "It is not enough" he said, "that a product or
service be physically capable, as it were, of a noninfringing use.
19
Aside from the meaning of "merely capable," it is also not so easy
to say what should count as a cost. Courts say the costs are those
of "infringement," but what does that mean? The difficult fact is
that if we ignore dynamic effects, infringement benefits consumers.
15 Id.
6 See Wu, 103 Mich L Rev at 292-95 (cited in note 3).
Cf. Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47
Antitrust Bull 423 (2002).
8 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v Grokster Ltd., 380 F3d 1154 (9th Cir 2004).
1In re: Ainster Copyright Litigation, 334 F3d 643, 653 (7th Cir 2003) (Posner, J) ("It
is not enough, as we have said, that a product or service be physically capable, as it were,
of a noninfringing use [to escape liability under contributory infringement].").
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Any single instance of infringement is not a cost at all, but just a
transfer of wealth to the individual infringer. Rather in the sense
that Jesus was able to feed 5,000 people with "five loaves, and two
fishes, '2° millions of infringing consumers get something that costs
$15 for free, and no honest economist can ignore billions in con-
sumer surplus.
The costs, of course, are dynamic-the diminution of incentives
to produce things that society wants produced. Without reasonable
financial incentives to create new works, unpaid creativity may con-
tinue, 2 ' but investments in commercial entertainment will diminish
or disappear. But here the tricky question is distinguishing the costs
to authors as opposed to distributors. Given the advent of a new
technology, some of the "costs" may represent the fact that outdated
technologies are being put out of business, in the sense that com-
puters imposed costs on the typewriter industry. Should a court try
to figure out whether the costs of infringement are really costs that
will be felt by authors, as opposed to incumbent distributors?
One more thing needs to be said. The Sony Court tried to fit its
rule somewhere within the traditional common-law doctrine of con-
tributory liability. So while everyone knows that Sony asks courts
to judge the costs and benefits of a new technology, its doctrinal
cast is different. Sony purports to be about mens rea-deciding
whether constructive knowledge of infringement is sufficient to
constitute knowledge for purposes of contributory liability. (Non-
copyright lawyers are often surprised to find out that major ques-
tions of competition policy are settled this way.) As we shall see,
this link to "knowledge" is the "bad actor" side of the test for
contributory liability. The idea is that, regardless of the costs and
benefits discussed in Sony, a company that knowingly helps infringe
copyright ought be liable no matter how beneficial its technology
is.
The Sony court did something unusual: it put an economic test
in the middle of a mens rea-driven standard. That, as we shall see,
had important consequences for the Grokster litigation. But first we
turn to antitrust, where Courts have been asking Sony-like questions
for more than a century.
"0 Matthew 14:15-21 (King James).
21 For a description of some of the mechanisms underlying noncommercial creativity,
see Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale L J 369
(2002).
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II. Two ANTITRUST APPROACHES
In antitrust, courts regularly face the same "industry injury"
problem just described in the copyright context. In copyright, the
problem is that one company's business model (in Sony, the VCR)
is seen as injurious to the business model of others (in Sony, the
film industry). Antitrust is similarly faced with problems of allegedly
injurious behavior between firms. Predatory pricing, plaintiffs have
long argued, is a dastardly practice that big business uses to kill the
little guy. Mergers will create dangerous giants that will drive
smaller competitors out of business. A variety of business practices,
many of which are quite ungentlemanly, are alleged to be dangerous.
The challenge for courts is to figure out which of the many forms
of "bad behavior" should amount to illegal behavior.
Over the course of antitrust history there have been many schools
of antitrust thought, and this article is no survey.22 But on this issue
of intent and motive, to simplify enormously, over the last several
decades we have seen reflections of two main and competing de-
cisional approaches, the "bad actor" and "welfarist" approaches.
The "bad actor" approach to antitrust aims to punish or block
various ill-intended business practices that are regarded as wrongful,
and likely damaging to favored sectors of the economy. In the case
law, it is distinguished by an emphasis on motive or "economic
purpose," rather than net economic effect or consumer welfare.
During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when the approach was at the
peak of its popularity, the courts did not allow what they considered
"bad" practices to be justified by the prospect of gains in business
efficiency.23 They were willing to punish what they called bad be-
havior regardless of proof of injury to consumers or to the economy
as a whole. Conduct was punished on the basis of its effects on
favored sectors, such as "small dealers and worthy men," against
the abuses of the market.24
A well-known symbol of the "bad actor" method is the famous
case of Brown Shoe Co. v United States,2" decided in 1962. Brown
22 This is an enormous simplification. The history of battling "schools" of antitrust
thought is described in Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich L
Rev 213 (1985); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust, in Antonio
Cucinotta et al, eds, Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law 1 (2002).
23 See Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (cited in note 2).
24 United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 US 290, 343 (1897).
25 370 US 294 (1962).
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Shoe concerned a proposed merger between two shoe manufacturers
and retailers who, collectively, would control about 5 percent of the
manufacturing market and 2.1 percent of the retail market (this
number was higher in some cities). Despite the relatively small
numbers, the Court blocked the merger, in large part based on the
purpose of the merger. The Court ruled that it was essential to
examine the "very nature and purpose of the arrangement"-the
"economic purpose" of the merging companies. The merger, it
turned out, was motivated not by an interest in rescuing a failing
company, or even by an interest in allowing two small companies
to defeat larger opponents. Instead, it featured two successful com-
panies who hoped to use their new size to aggressively expand their
market share. That, said the Court, was a trend that should be
halted.26 The Court justified the decision by declaring that antitrust
had a particular concern for a certain "economic way of life. '27 That
meant using the law for the protection of certain sectors of the
economy-to protect against adverse effects "upon local control of
industry and upon small business.
28
As everyone familiar with antitrust knows, the "bad actor" ap-
proach represented by Brown Shoe has been not only criticized, but
also renounced, and ultimately upended. Most of the attack came
from the "Chicago School," historically composed of people who
at some point or another worked with Aaron Director at the Uni-
versity of Chicago. Writing in 1976, for example, Richard Posner
said of Brown Shoe, "one has no sense that the Court had any notion
of how a non-monopolistic merger might affect competition.
29
Robert Bork, in his book The Antitrust Paradox, wrote that "[i]t
would not be overhasty to say that the Brown Shoe opinion is the
worst antitrust essay ever written." Bork, paraphrasing Justice Ste-
vens, also left us with this memorable description of the "bad actor"
approach to antitrust:
Antitrust. . .is in the good old American tradition of the sheriff
of a frontier town: he did not sift evidence, distinguish between
suspects, and solve crimes, but merely walked the main street
and every so often pistol-whipped a few people.3"
26 Id at 333.
27 Id.
28 Id.
2' Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 102 (1976).
30 See Bork, The Antitrust Paradox at 6 (cited in note 2).
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Even Phillip Areeda, writing at greater distance from the Chicago
School, wrote that "in the great majority of antitrust cases, talk of
'purpose or intent' is largely diversionary or redundant ...one
must concentrate on conduct and define its characteristics that are
undesirable.""3
The principal criticism advanced by the Chicago School was sim-
ple: the courts had relied too much on considerations like "bad
motives" and failed to justify their intervention by any reference to
the effects on the economy as a whole. The Chicago School pro-
posed the alternative and now dominant approach, a welfarist ap-
proach. Its central argument is that the maximization of consumer
welfare should in all cases be the primary goal of competition policy.
In judicial practice, that meant that every condemnation of a given
business practice should be accompanied by some proof that the
practice in general is actually bad for the consumer.
In contemporary antitrust theory and judicial practice, the wel-
farist approach now dominates. Yet that does not mean that we have
Robert Bork's antitrust law. There remains much disagreement
within the welfarist decisional method over whether writers like
Bork were correct about what counts as harmless or efficiency-
promoting business practice. For example, many scholars in the
"new institutional economics" school take a very different view of
vertical integration than Bork did.32 But the Chicago School's larger
point-that damage to consumer welfare should be the sine qua
non of antitrust illegality-is today essentially uncontested.33
A. GROKSTER
It was perhaps inevitable that the Court in copyright would one
day face a Brown Shoe-like case, and it turned out to be Grokster.
The Grokster case was the culmination of nearly five years of con-
stant litigation centered on the invention of mass "file-sharing"
technology in the late 1990s. 34 The questions in Grokster were
3' Areeda and Hovenkamp, 3 Antitrust Law T 651 (cited in note 5).
32 See Hovenkamp, The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust (cited in note 22).
Essentially, but not entirely. See, e.g., David W. Barnes, Revolutionary Antitrust: Ef-
ficiency, Ideology, and Democracy, 58 U Cin L Rev 59 (1989) (defending Brown Shoe approach
as more consistent with American democracy); Kenworthey Bilz, Populist Wealth in Legal
Economic Analysis (Oct 12, 1998) (unpublished manuscript).
3" For an account of the evolution of file-sharing technologies, see Timothy Wu, When
Code Isn't Law, 89 Va L Rev 679, 726-43 (2003).
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created, at the broadest level, by the popularization of the internet,
which makes possible mass dissemination of expressive works with-
out the industries that have long specialized in such dissemination.
To be blunt, the internet threatened to make large parts of the
incumbent distribution industries obsolete. Online distribution is
a particular threat to the recording industry and its favored model
of the retail compact disc.
File-sharing, or "peer-to-peer" (P2P) software, in its various
forms, is a type of program that lets people share information
without help from any centralized distributor. These programs
make it easy for millions to copy and distribute information with-
out permission, while the copyright law has long been premised
on the fact that doing so is hard.3"
The file-sharing attack on industry structure came in waves. As
everyone knows, the first came from a college dorm and a student
nicknamed "Napster." His Napster program was the first to make
file-sharing a mass phenomenon. But Napster's design also gave
its owners both knowledge and control of the sharing it facilitated,
and Napster was quickly buried by the Ninth Circuit.3 6
The Grokster litigation, the second wave, was a truer test of file-
sharing technology. Napster's greatest successor was a program
named Kazaa, produced by an Amsterdam-residing Swede named
Niklas Zenstrom, aided by a mysterious team of Estonian
programmers. Kazaa's basic design concept was adopted or li-
censed by other companies, including "Grokster," the first defen-
dant by alphabetical order in the Grokster litigation. The difference
between Napster and Kazaa is slightly technical, but suffice it to
say that Kazaa was by design much closer to a purely neutral file-
sharing technology.37 The programs could be used to swap just
about any kind of file, and the producers of Kazaa or Grokster
had no immediate control over their users and no specific knowl-
edge of what any one user was up to.
I have described file-sharing technology as just a technology for
sharing information. But despite the great labors of the defendants
" Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters,
and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 Colum L Rev 1466, 1488 (1995) (discussing the role of
intermediaries); Wu, 89 Va L Rev (cited in note 34) (same).
36 See A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc., 239 F3d 1004 (9th Cir 2001).
31 See Wu, 89 Va L Rev (cited in note 34), for a description of the technical differences
between Napster and Kazaa.
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and other groups, the social meaning of file-sharing was and is
quite different. Programs like Kazaa and Grokster have always
been understood not just as a new means of disseminating infor-
mation, but as a way to get music and sometimes movies for free.
They had a reputation, in other words, as pirates.
For many, P2P's rebellious nature was the whole point-it was
a new technology that might liberate music from the chokehold
of what some saw as a corrupt and abusive recording industry.
Professor Siva Vaidhyanathan has called the use of file-sharing
networks "civil disobedience." As Justin Frankel, "the world's most
dangerous geek," put it, the point of file-sharing programs was
"giving power to people, and what can be wrong with that?"38
But P2 P's reputation did not help in the quintessentially uptight
city of Washington, D.C. The file-sharing movement was seen
less as a legitimate market entrant and instead as a bunch of radicals
hailing from the West Coast and Amsterdam. The contrast with
Sony from the 1970s is important. Then, the film industry tried
to portray Sony as a foreign "invading" force-Jack Valenti, lob-
byist for the film industry, called the VCR "a great tidal wave just
off the shore."39 But it did not work.4" Sony was the inventor of
the Walkman and other gadgets, and widely beloved. It came to
Court as a respectable, even earnest company whose products were
used by decent citizens. That cultural difference between Kazaa
on the one hand and Sony on the other arguably made a difference
in the Grokster litigation.
The Court, in deciding Grokster, faced the problem of method
we described in the antitrust context. Would it try to decide the
case under Sony by assessing whether, on balance, the benefits of
Grokster's technologies were worth the costs measured in terms
of authorial incentives? Or might it be easier to decide the case
by looking at the motives of the actors involved? In Bork's terms,
might it just be easier to pistol-whip a few bad guys?
The Court took the easy way out, and the reasons are easy to
understand. The Justices could not agree on the hard question-
3 David Kushner, The World's Most Dangerous Geek, Rolling Stone (Jan 13, 2004).
3 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on HR 4783, HR 4794, HR 4808,
HR 5250, HR 5488, and HR 5705 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong,
2d Sess 5 (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Assoc. of America).
40 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of the VCR 2 1
(1987).
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whether the Sony rule, which calls for some balance of costs and
benefit, allowed Grokster to survive (in concurrences, they split
3-3 on the question). The Seventh and Ninth Circuits had an-
nounced very different views of what Sony should mean. And the
briefing also gave the Court plenty of reasons for staying away
from Sony. Both sides warned of the terrible consequences of ad-
justing the Sony rule. The recording industry and some academics
warned of chaos that might attend adopting an expanded Sony that
declared Grokster legal.4' On the other side, the computer hard-
ware, software, and electronics industries and others warned of
the toil and trouble that would attend the destruction of their
beloved Sony safe harbor.42 Whatever the Court did with Sony, it
was sure, or so the amici seemed to suggest, to make life in America
unlivable.
Meanwhile, there was a much easier way out. All of the Justices
could plainly see that Grokster, Kazaa, and the like were running
a crooked business. Everyone knew these companies were not
"legitimate" market entrants like Sony, but rather companies try-
ing to make a quick buck on copyright infringement. So the Court
pistol-whipped Grokster out of business. In doing so, it purported
to leave Sony alone, hoping to mollify everyone by grabbing a rule
from the patent statute that fit what it did not like about Grokster's
business model. The Court created a test designed to catch com-
panies with a bad attitude.
The result is the "active-inducement" test, the first test in copy-
right history that asks a court to look at a defendant's business
model and decide whether its motives are crooked. It is a test that
bears strong similarities to similar intent-based approaches in an-
41 See, e.g., Brieffor Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company Petitioners, at 19, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd., 125 S Ct 2467 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit's
Sony theory "perversely encourages such efforts to defeat copyright enforcement, and
disadvantages businesses that seek in good faith to prevent violations of copyright holders'
rights."); Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, Economics Professors, and Treatise Authors,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd., 125 S Ct 2467 (upholding Ninth Circuit
"could negatively affect myriad existing technologies, undermine the copyright system,
destroy the economic viability of legitimate file-sharing services, and retard future in-
novation in both the technological and authorial communities.").
42 See, e.g., Brief of Intel Corporation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, at 5, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd., 125 S Ct 2467 (if Sony were uprooted, "in-
novators, such as Intel, would have no choice but to withhold from the market socially
and economically useful products. The national economy, which has grown through tech-
nological innovation over the 20 years since this Court decided Sony, would suffer.") .
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titrust law. But before getting to an analysis of that test, a few
notes on the opinion.
The Grokster opinion is notable, compared to the Court's earlier
decisions, for how little awe the Court seemed to have for the
internet. Back in 1997, the Court called the internet "a unique
medium-known to its users as 'cyberspace'-located in no par-
ticular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in
the world . . .. " But by 2005, the honeymoon was over. The
fact that the internet was part of the litigation was important, but
there was little of the technolibertarianism that characterized many
of the internet decisions of the 1990s. Stated otherwise, with
Grokster, internet analysis has come to splinter largely based on
usage, or application.'
Second, the Court described a central question in copyright as
follows:
The more artistic protection is favored, the more technological
innovation may be discouraged; the administration of copyright
law is an exercise in managing the trade-off."
That is not the traditional way that the Court discusses copyright's
balance. The traditional way of describing the balance is that copy-
right is either "a tax on readers for the benefit of writers," or "a
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative
work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public avail-
ability of literature, music, and the other arts."46 The Supreme
Court's words in Grokster may reflect some awareness that the
Court was dealing with the "communications policy" side of copy-
right, or regulation of new and old technologies of dissemination,
where the interests at stake are indeed different than in the purely
authorial context.
On to the test itself. The active-inducement test itself says that
a company is to be punished if it "distributes a device with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright."47 That, the
4 See Reno v ACLU, 521 US 844, 851 (1997).
See Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 Va L Rev 1163 (1999)
(describing future where internet cases split by application type).
" 125 S Ct at 2775.
46 Twentieth Centvny Music Corp. v Aiken, 422 US 151, 156 (1975).
" 125 S Ct at 2780.
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Court explained, is "shown by clear expression or other affirmative
steps taken to foster infringement."48 What such "affirmative
steps" might be, the Court did not explain completely, but it did
find enough of them evident in the Grokster litigation. Most im-
portant, said the Court, were three things: solicitation of infringe-
ment, design, and commercial interest.
The programs in question had a suspect lineage: all were de-
signed to appeal to the users of the "notorious . . . Napster.
49
The Court made much of the fact that one of the defendants,
Streamcast, developed advertising materials that called the product
the "#1 Alternative to Napster." (Notably, the advertisements were
not actually released, on the advice of Streamcast's lawyers.) Sec-
ond, none of the companies designed their products to prevent
infringement (though the Court quickly added that merely not
designing a product to prevent infringement was not enough-
more on this in an instant). And, finally, the Court pointed out,
ad-driven business models need volume to succeed, and since the
demand is for infringement, their commercial interest was served
by infringement."0 The Court found what it wanted to confirm
what it already thought: these guys were up to no good.
Readers who are not copyright lawyers may be curious to know
how, exactly, a major economic decision about the future of in-
dustry competition could come to be influenced by the contents
of a proposed advertising campaign. The doctrinal answer is, as
we discussed above, that the common law of contributory copy-
right liability left an opening, for it makes everything depend on
the mens rea of the alleged contributory infringer. Sony, while really
a decision about market entry, is doctrinally a decision about when
constructive knowledge suffices to create contributory copyright
liability. In other words, for better or worse, you can find a "bad
actor" approach already built into copyright's common-law con-
tributory infringement doctrine.
Another reason, which may seem absurd to non-lawyers, is that
there was a pleasing doctrinal symmetry in adding an active-in-
ducement test to copyright. In Sony itself, the Court had declared
that the "substantial non-infringing" test was based on a doctrine
4 8 Id.
49 Id at 2772.
'Old at 2781-82.
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in § 271(c) of the patent statute. The active-inducement test is
just one statutory section away, in § 271(b). (As Randal Picker put
it, "you might say it took the Court 20 years to move us one
section into the patent law."5 ) Since the patent law has these two
bases for infringement, why not copyright?
B. WHAT DOES GROKSTER MEAN?
Within hours of the decision's release, copyright watchers were
asking, "but what does it mean?" The "induce" formulation, as
many have complained, is open-ended. What is a "clear expression
or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement?" As Re-
becca Tushnet asked, are Apple's famous "rip, mix, burn" adver-
tisements enough? 2 We may organize the discussion by saying
that Grokster leaves behind three sets of questions. First, what is
left of Sony? Second, what, exactly, does Grokster say about product
design? And, third, what will Grokster mean for actual copyright
litigation?
The main doctrinal question after Grokster is what, if anything,
remains of the Sony safe harbor. It is true that the Court on several
occasions expressly said it was leaving the Sony rule alone, that it
would "leave further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when
that may be required."" But if the Grokster rule makes Sony ir-
relevant for most cases, then Sony may merely be preserved, as
Fred Von Lohmann puts it, "in amber."
The question can be framed by asking what happens to the next
program that has only a few, or even none, of the elements Grokster
described as probative to an intent to induce infringement, yet still
is widely used for infringement. Recall that Grokster named three
things that courts might look at as acts probative of inducement:
(1) Promotion or solicitation of infringement (i.e., advertis-
ing);
(2) Failure to filter; and
(3) A business model dependent on massive infringement.
s' See Randal Picker, Remarks at the Telecommunications Policy and Research Con-
ference (Sept 23, 2005).
52 Posting of Rebecca Tushnet to http://www.scotusblog.com/discussion/archives/groks-
ter/ (June 28, 2005).
" 125 S Ct at 2779; see also id at 2781 n 12.
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(The Court also added that neither evidence of (2) nor (3) standing
alone would be sufficient evidence of intent 4 )
Consider three problems. First, a "copyright liberation" website
might promote infringement and fail to filter, but have no business
model.5" Second, a company (Apple is arguably in this category)
might benefit and arguably depend on mass infringement, yet not
take any steps to encourage it, and even use encryption technology
to discourage infringement. And, finally, consider the "passive en-
abler" site that facilitates infringement, yet otherwise does nothing:
it takes no proactive steps, other than existing to encourage in-
fringement. For these kinds of problems, does copyright liability
attach, and is Grokster the relevant rule, or Sony?
A key question for each of these examples is whether the bare
fact of massive infringement means that the software manufacturer
has the "object of promoting [the program's] use to infringe copy-
right." It is not a question answered in the opinion, and it seems
the only way to get at it is to ask whether willful blindness suffices
to create liability under Grokster. To restate, if you know, for con-
textual reasons, that your program will be used for massive in-
fringement, and you release the product anyway, is the act of re-
leasing the product the inducement of copyright infringement?-
We can discuss three ways to answer the question. Jane Ginsburg
provides the first. She believes that these kinds of hard Grokster
problems will be effectively converted into Sony problems. "Spec-
ulation is hazardous," she writes, "but one might predict that where
a device facilitates infringement on a massive scale, its distributor
will likely be found to have intended that result. Where the in-
fringement is relatively modest in scale, inducement will not be
found, but neither will the Sony threshold for liability be crossed." 6
In other words, whatever the labels, everything will ultimately turn
on the old Sony question of whether the technology facilitates too
much infringement. We can call this theory the Grokster-via-Sony
theory-the idea being that a device that fails Sony can easily and
automatically be called a copyright inducer under Grokster.
A second and perhaps less rigorous prediction is that the answer
"Id at 2780-82.
"This example is taken from Jane Ginsburg and Sam Ricketson, Inducers and Authorizers:
A Comparison of the U.S. Supreme Court's Grokster Decision and the Australian Federal Court's
KaZaa ruling 7 (January 6, 2006, draft on file with author).
516 Id at 6-7.
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may end up having much to do with what I have called a program's
"lineage." The Court in Grokster, in effect, was trying to kill a family
line-Napster and its progeny. And one prediction is that programs
inspired by and designed to do what Napster did-make file-sharing
easy for millions of people-will result in liability under Grokster
The idea is that if you design a follow-on program, you must know
that you are trying to facilitate massive infringement, whether under
a willful blindness theory or otherwise. Meanwhile, passive enablers
that do not share Napster's lineage are safe.
The lineage theory suggests that Sony remains the rule for tech-
nologies that never knew Napster-technologies clearly and obvi-
ously designed for purposes other than infringement and used pre-
dominantly for that purpose. For example, email and Microsoft's
Explorer browser are in practice used to facilitate massive copyright
infringement. But they do not have any historical connection to
Napster/Grokster, are widely used for legitimate purposes, and were
never designed for copyright infringement. Also, perhaps critically,
their business model does not depend on infringement in an obvious
way.
The third theory is the "active-step" theory. The Supreme Court
said in Grokster that
mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing
uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability.
Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such
as offering customers technical support or product updates, sup-
port liability in themselves. The inducement rule, instead, prem-
ises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and
thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or dis-
courage innovation having a lawful promise. 7
This suggests that so long as companies either do not actively take
a single step to encourage infringement, they simply cannot be liable
under an inducement theory. Instead, in the absence of any active
steps, the relevant test is, again, Sony. If this reading is right, willful
blindness is irrelevant-there has to be some affirmative act in ques-
tion for inducement liability to exist.
The passive-enabler question is sharpened by considering
BitTorrent. BitTorrent has been widely seen as the "next wave" in
file-sharing software-one even more powerful than Kazaa, and
" 125 S Ct at 2780.
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more often used for legal reasons.5 8 As it stands, both the Grokster-
via-Sony and the lineage theory predict bad news for BitTorrent
sites. Even passive sites will be held liable for inducing a copyright
violation if they make the technology available with what they know,
unless they take advantage of a Grokster safe harbor, as I describe
in a moment. Conversely, if the active-step theory is right, a site
that is purely passive cannot find itself liable under Grokster (though
it may still face Sony liability).
But to fully answer the question, we need to turn to the topic of
safe harbors. What did Grokster really say about product design?
Does it require all copying devices to have filters or centralized
control? Discussing product design and, in particular, filtering,
Grokster said the following in footnote 12:
Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent [other than
a failure to screen], a court would be unable to find contributory
infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative
steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable
of substantial noninfringing uses. Such a holding would tread
too close to the Sony safe harbor. 9
This language says that failure to filter is not, by itself, enough to
prove infringement given a product that is otherwise legal under
Sony. This language supports the conclusion that companies like
email providers cannot be secondarily liable merely because they
do not block all emails carrying infringing works. Yet one might
also infer from this language that Grokster creates a kind of safe
harbor that may prove important. It may be read to suggest that a
product that does filter is presumptively not a product that is in-
tended to promote infringement, even if it does, in practice, facil-
itate infringement.6" In other words, Grokster is good news for Ap-
ple's iPod and iTunes download store, which, as in the example
below, do lead to infringement, but also make some effort to prevent
s See Wikipedia, BitTorrent, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent.
9 125 S Ct at 2781 n 12.
'The question is then this: What happens if a company puts in place a filter, or an
encryption system, designed to prevent infringement, that fails? For example, while the
iPod is meant to prevent people from sharing files, many have learned how to disable the
protections. Is the manufacturer liable if its systems fail? Does the analysis then turn to
a Sony question-namely, how often is the system used legally, versus illegally? My guess
is that a good-faith effort to filter will be enough, but only time will tell.
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illegal copying. The opinion may even have been written with the
iPod in mind.
The final set of important Sony/Grokster questions is procedural.
What difference will Grokster, as opposed to Sony, make in actual
copyright litigation? Will Grokster make it much easier to threaten
innovators with lawsuits? We can probably assume that every copy-
right plaintiff will, as a matter of course, bring an inducement count
in any future litigation. For summary judgment purposes, might we
expect that Grokster, and not Sony, will drive the litigation? Perhaps
the evidentiary issue of "intent" will be harder to escape on summary
judgment, and in any cases more expensive to litigate than design
alone. And that, obviously, favors copyright plaintiffs with lots of
resources.
61
In short, the procedural consequences of Grokster may be the most
important for the future of innovation. One rather pessimistic view
suggests that the Grokster rule will help big innovators at the expense
of smaller innovators. As an innovation test, it creates some degree
of uncertainty, which will lead to more deal-making, more settlement,
and payoffs to industry, as in the example of Apple's iTunes. A com-
petitor to Kazaa at the time of litigation, iTunes keeps prices relatively
high relative to its costs, and hands over much of its proceeds to the
old recording industry, the existing copyright distributors. That, the
argument goes; hurts smaller, newer innovators, who will never have
the resources to pay off the incumbent industries. Indeed, it is hard
to imagine wanting to start or fund a company that has to worry a
lot about Grokster issues, and lacks either the size or wherewithal to
find partners.
Is there a contrary view of Grokster? It must be correct that, on
balance, a new theory of liability does not help the new firms whose
business models touch and concern copyrighted materials. But we
also know that the decision was, as we have said, an effort to be
minimalist-to kill Grokster without guaranteeing permanent life
support for the recording industry.62 And so a contrasting view is
that Grokster may not mean much ("what decision?").
If the active-step theory of Grokster is right, then the conse-
quences of Grokster may be fairly minimal. It all comes back to what
is likely to be the hardest question at summary judgment: to what
61 Fed R Civ P 56(0.
62 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Supreme Court Review 47.
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extent can "intent" be inferred from "design." This is the same as
the question discussed above-whether passive knowledge of wide-
spread illegal use, plus a failure to design software or hardware to
do anything about it, is enough to count as inducement.
III. GROKSTER'S COMPETITION POLICY
Grokster was a political compromise. But the deeper ques-
tions raised by Grokster are not what "induce" means, or even
whether Grokster was a successful political settlement.63 The ques-
tion is how far the Court should go in deciding these kinds of cases
with inducement rules that study the behavior of the particular
companies in question. Why should the law care what some Swedish
businessman was thinking when he wrote advertisements for Kazaa?
Should the contents of proposed advertising campaigns really tip
American industrial policy one way or another?
Remember what the Court is doing: it is blessing or cursing the
market entry of a given technological device. Whether the object
was to "promote its use to infringe copyright" is arguably irrelevant.
The right question is this: either a given technology is worth its
costs, or it is not. Either Grokster's or BitTorrent's efficiencies and
gains in user welfare are worth the damage to authorial incentives,
or they are not. That is not an easy question, necessarily. But why
should we care what Streamcast's advertising manager was thinking?
While I do not want to say that an intent test will never be a
useful tool in copyright, the argument is that it is not the right tool
for handling market-entry problems. Let us look at the argument
in favor of relying on a test of bad behavior. One defense might be
that the mens rea of a defendant is, in fact, a good or useful way of
deciding whether a given technology is worth its costs. A defense
of this approach runs something as follows. Mens rea tests are good
for identifying particularly dangerous actors. The criminal law does,
for example, offer different punishments for people who kill people,
depending on what they were thinking at the time. In that context,
the premeditated killer is more dangerous to leave at large than,
say, someone who was provoked. Translated to copyright, the idea
might be that between company A and company B, even if both
63 See Congressman Rich Boucher, Remarks at Stanford Law School (Sept 19, 2005)
(praising Grokster decision as "wise" because no one came to Congress afterward seeking
legislation).
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use the exact same technology, if company A encourages others to
infringe copyright, it is the more dangerous actor and should be
stopped.
A second answer is that the whole intent analysis in Grokster is
really just a proxy for weeding out companies engaged in something
the copyright law knows to be bad. In support of this position we
have Justice Kennedy's question at oral argument:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: What you want to do is say that un-
lawfully expropriated property can be used by the owner of the
instrumentality as part of the startup capital for his product.
MR. TARANTO: I-wel-
JUSTICE KENNEDY: And I-just from an economic stand-
point and a legal standpoint, that sounds wrong to me.64
Justice Kennedy's arguments suggest that while we might not know
much about copyright, we at least know that infringement upsets
whatever balance the statute intended. So looking to matters like
intent, advertising campaigns, and so on functions as a kind of radar
that detects mass infringement and lets a court put a stop to it.
But if the point of focusing on inducement is that it suggests
mass infringement, why not just do so directly? Why not just ask
whether the device creates too much infringement, and therefore
too much damage to authorial incentives? If infringement is in the
end what we care about, the whole examination of the conduct of
defendant companies may just be a distraction. And the problem,
as antitrust law shows, is that the distraction can quickly take on a
life of its own.
In the 1960s, the courts in cases like Brown Shoe were confident
that a focus on motives, as opposed to effects, was a good way to
regulate competition. But the problem is that even when people
have what may seem like bad intentions, what they are doing may
nonetheless be good for the economy. The point-that bad behavior
may serve the common good-is really not new it all. It is Adam
Smith's idea that much public good can result from self-interested,
and even ungentlemanly, behavior. "It is not from the benevolence
6' See Oral Argument Transcript at 36, MGM Studios, Inc. v Grokster Ltd, 125 S Ct
2764 (No 04-480), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument
_transcripts/04-480.pdf.
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of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner,
but from their regard to their own interest."65
My argument that the court should care about infringement and
its effects, period, is susceptible to one further, and powerful, ob-
jection. In antitrust, there seems to be a better sense of what con-
stitutes a well-functioning, competitive market. Meanwhile, as
George Priest said of intellectual property generally, it is much
harder to say what constitutes optimal copyright scope.66 Copyright
policy is aiming for something hard-the optimal subsidization of
desirable behavior. The good thing about Grokster is that it did not
actually focus on the Sony question, because the Sony question is
just too hard for a court to answer. Instead, Grokster killed a few
bad apples, and left the rest to the market.
While I appreciate the force of this argument, I think it leads in
a completely different direction. It suggests not only that the Court
should not try to differentiate the good guys from the bad guys,
but that it should not be asking Sony questions either. Instead, it
suggests that the Court should get out of the entire business of
trying to bless or curse technologies, and implicitly adjusting the
optimal subsidy to existing copyright industries. Instead, the Court
should do everything it can to delegate these problems back to
Congress. We will consider these arguments in the last section.
Whether it uses Grokster or Sony, the Court has put itself, and
lower courts, in the position of picking winners and losers out of
the market entrants that the next decade will bring. In this respect
the Court is, as we have already said, conducting industrial policy,
along lines very similar to what the FCC does. Yet for a variety of
reasons courts have long deferred to either Congress or the FCC
when faced with such problems-because the questions are eco-
nomic, and highly technical.
National Cable & Telecommunications Assn v Brand X Internet Ser-
vices67 was released on the same day as Grokster, but the contrast in
decisional method could not be stronger. The underlying policy
question in Brand X was challenging: How should broadband com-
petition be managed? Should the government try to prevent vertical
6" Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 119 (first
printed 1776, Penguin Classics ed, 1999).
66 See George Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property, 8 Res
Law & Econ 19 (1986).
67 125 S Ct 2688 (2005).
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integration by DSL and cable operators? And should it try to create
a similar regulatory structure for the two main competitors? As we
will see, the Court was so allergic to trying to answer these questions
and pick winners and losers that it bent backward to get itself out
of broadband policy. That makes it more surprising that the Court
has not tried to do the same in copyright.
The legal issue in Brand X was a Chevron question: whether the
FCC had violated the plain language of the Telecommunications
Act when it classified internet cable-modem services as an "infor-
mation service." In telecommunications law jargon, an "information
service" is a highly discretionary category where the FCC has the
power to impose as few or potentially (though it has not yet tried)
as many regulatory requirements as it wants. "Information service,"
to exaggerate slightly, means carte blanche for the FCC and what-
ever it thinks might be best. In Brand X, the Court, relying on
Chevron, deferred to the commission's decision that cable-modem
services could be classified as an "information service."
Deference sounds like a good idea-the only problem is some-
thing called Chevron and the plain language of the Telecommuni-
cations Act. Unfortunately, cable-modem service does not come
close to fitting the statutory definition of "information service."68
What cable operators offer is usually a package of internet service
plus the basic transport service, although sometimes the internet
services are provided or offered by a third party. The raw transport
of bits is a much closer fit with another legal category, "telecom-
munications."" But being a "telecommunications" service imposes
all kinds of regulatory requirements. And since the Court, we can
surmise, wanted to give the FCC room to decide how much reg-
ulation was appropriate, it had to somehow squeeze cable-modem
services into the "information service" definition.
Consequently, the opinion in Brand X is a little off, and what it
says about administrative law and the internet will, one hopes, be
forgotten soon. Briefly, the FCC relied on the idea that internet
and transport services are offered as a single integrated package.
6 "The term 'information service' means the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available in-
formation via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing . 47 USC §
153(20) (1997).
69 "The term 'telecommunications' means the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form
or content of the information as sent and received." 47 USC § 153(43) (1997).
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The Court concluded that the FCC was justified in calling that
package an "information service." But the premise is wrong as both
a technological and a business matter.
AOL and Earthlink, among others, are called internet service
providers, or ISPs for short. They offer internet services, and even
offer such services, on some networks, to cable-modem customers.
That stubborn fact impeaches the "single-service" theory, because
if companies other than cable operators actually offer the internet
side of the service, the transport service is all that the cable operator
offers. Justice Scalia said, in dissent, that it would be odd to say
that a pizzeria that delivers pizza does not offer a "delivery service."70
But the truth is even starker than Justice Scalia described. Imagine
a company that did nothing but deliver other companies' pizzas. If
that company does not offer delivery services, then what, exactly,
do they offer?
Fortunately, the Court has shown no need to be consistent in
how it characterizes the internet across different kinds of cases.
What is more interesting is that all of the bending and squeezing
out of Chevron and the plain language of the Act was for the purpose
of getting the Court out of telecommunications policy. The Court
did not want to decide the truly difficult economic questions facing
the broadband industry. It did not want to decide whether open-
access rules for cable might speed or restrict deployment, and
whether horizontal parity might be a good idea. The result of the
Brand X decision was to give the FCC more room to decide on the
future of broadband.
That "bend-over-backward" deference is what makes the contrast
with Grokster so sharp. In both cases, the Court faced difficult eco-
nomic questions centered on new technologies and dynamic in-
dustries. Yet in Grokster the Court decided that it was fully com-
petent to decide that a given business model based on a new
technology was not a good idea for the national economy. In Brand
X, the same Court is positively terrified of trying to answer what
amount to similar types of questions. There were no obvious good
guys and bad guys in Brand X, but is that really what should make
the difference?
All this suggests that perhaps the most principled outcome in
Grokster would have been for the Court to take a different course
70 125 S Ct at 2714 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
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even than that suggested by the Sony decision. As we said earlier,
Sony professed to defer to Congress, yet at the same time created
a substantive rule for the market entry of new technologies. The
Court might have gone back further, before Sony, and taken the
approach of earlier cases like Fortnightly Corp. v United Artists,7
Teleprompter Corp. v Columbia Broadcasting Systems,72 and White-
Smith Music Publishing Co. v Apollo Co.73 In each of those cases the
court confronted the same problem it had in Grokster and Sony-
a new technological industry (the record and piano player, and var-
ious kinds of cable television) facing off against an incumbent in-
dustry. The Court in those cases said, in essence, we don't have a
clue, found no copyright liability, and left things for Congress to
fix. The Court in those cases made it clear that the Copyright Act,
as written, had no answers to the problem presented, and that the
Court did not trust itself to fashion one.
It is a little too easy to say the Court should have just deferred;
some of the disadvantages of institutional deference are worth dis-
cussing. Had the Court let Grokster off with a note to Congress,
the result would have been some kind of congressional settlement
of the dispute. However, that is another name for an interest-group
free-for-all that would have been time consuming, expensive, and
may have damaged whatever integrity the copyright code still has.74
The congressional or, more accurately, interest-group mode of
copyright policy-making has well-documented weaknesses. Its rec-
ord is a mix of arguable successes along with many outright fail-
ures.
75
It may be that the Court in Grokster managed to replicate what
Congress would have done, in less time. But as the comparison with
telecommunications law makes clear, in the long run, the Court
will need to ask itself when it is and is not competent to set industrial
policy for the information sectors through ever more elaborate in-
7' 392 US 390, 399 (1968).
72 415 US 394 (1974).
73 209 US 1 (1908).
74 As David Nimmer points out, interest-group-driven amendments have made a mess
of the copyright statute. See David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA
L Rev 1233, 1238 (2004).
7' For a general history of the interest-group process in copyright and its results, see
Wu, 103 Mich L Rev (cited in note 3); Jessica Litrman, Copyright Legislation and Technological
Change, 68 Ore L Rev 275 (1989); Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Tech-
nologies of Dissemination, 101 Colum L Rev 1613, 1622 (2001).
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terpretations of the copyright statute. Copyright, in this respect,
faces a question of legal process that is difficult to answer. When
do courts remain competent to answer the economic questions pre-
sented by disruptive technologies, and when does deference back
to Congress become a better course of action? At a minimum the
Court needs to give itself the option, when it faces copyright ques-
tions that are just too hard, to direct the problem to Congress with
a "fix-me" attached.
IV. CONCLUSION
When compared with either antitrust or communications
laws' management of competition, copyright's approach is unusual.
No one doubts that the underlying questions are hard no matter
who asks them. Yet courts have taken to regulating the information
industries by asking questions that have very little to do with the
economic effects on the industries regulated. Discussing matters
like "knowledge" or "inducement" is an unusual way to take into
account matters like industry structure, innovation, and other
macro-economic questions.
The results may be defensible in individual cases. But as rules
for industry, they will be something of a random walk: sometimes
defensible, but often not. The fact is that courts in antitrust, copy-
right, and telecommunications cases are now facing very similar
problems. In coming years, the Court and other federal courts
should self-consciously accept the role they are playing in setting
the terms of competition in information industries, and strive to
make industrial policy the best it might be.
